NEWS

EU waters down 2035 car engine ban while pushing firms to buy more EVs

Brussels pitches a dual track plan of softer CO₂ rules and binding corporate fleet targets, betting that flexibility for industry can still deliver its Green Deal goals amid Chinese pressure and an energy shock. In a packed Brussels press room, European commissioners, Ms. Viola Pomili Pomili, Commissioner for Climate Action and Ms. Sara Pauro, Commissioner for Mobility and Transport, unveiled what they framed as a decisive package for the future of Europe’s auto industry and, by extension, for the credibility of the bloc’s Green Deal. The proposal lands at a politically sensitive moment. Carmakers are grappling with rising energy costs, intensifying competition from China and a slower than expected electric vehicle rollout. At the same time, climate targets are looming. At the heart of the announcement is a carefully calibrated trade-off : the Commission is softening how carmakers must comply with the bloc’s landmark 2035 CO2 standards, while simultaneously forcing large corporate fleets to switch faster to zero- and low-emission vehicles.

Officials insist the measures are “complementary” but not contradictory. However, across capitals, industry boardrooms and environmental groups, the package is likely to be read as a significant political recalibration.

What Brussels is proposing

Softer CO₂ standards, same 2035 endgame

The Commission says Europe remains on track toward a “trajectory” of 100 percent CO2 reduction for new cars by 2035. Yet in practice, manufacturers would now face a formal obligation of 90 percent emissions cuts, with the remaining 10 percent covered through compensation mechanisms. These could include the use of sustainable renewable fuels or credits tied to low-carbon steel produced in Europe. Officials stress that “every ton of CO2 is accounted for,” arguing the system offers flexibility without granting industry a free pass. To further stimulate demand and domestic production, Brussels is proposing so-called super-credits, effectively a 1.3 multiplier for small electric vehicles manufactured within the EU. The idea is to make compact EVs more affordable while supporting European supply chains. Additional flexibility would also be granted to vans and heavy-duty vehicles, allowing them to accumulate more emission credits before 2030 in recognition of slower infrastructure rollout and operational constraints in freight transport.

Binding targets for corporate fleets

On the demand side, the Commission is taking a tougher line. From 2030, member states would be required to ensure that a specific share of new corporate cars and vans are zero- or low-emission. A minimum sub-target would apply to fully zero-emission vehicles. The rules would apply only to large companies, defined as those with more than 250 employees and significant turnover, while small firms and private households would be explicitly exempted.

Although national targets would be binding, governments would retain broad discretion over how to meet them, with objectives calibrated to economic capacity and charging infrastructure availability. Public incentives, meanwhile, would increasingly be tied to vehicles “made in the EU,” linking climate policy more directly to industrial and employment goals.

Brussels’ political pitch: flexibility, not backsliding

Commission officials present the package as the “climate pillar” of a wider industrial strategy designed to keep Europe competitive while staying aligned with its legally binding goal of climate neutrality by 2050.  Their argument is rooted in what they describe as a “triple challenge”: aggressive expansion by Chinese EV and battery producers, a more innovative and subsidy-heavy United States, and the escalating urgency of climate change. In that context, they say, the EU is “adjusting how compliance is achieved, not where the EU is going.” Policymakers point to the uneven, S-curve-shaped uptake of electric vehicles and warn that rigid targets risk destabilising manufacturers financially. An accompanying impact assessment suggests that additional flexibilities could spare carmakers around €7 billion in penalties, a figure Brussels uses to justify its shift in tone.

Winners, losers and the China–US shadow

Carmakers and key regions

The automotive sector remains a cornerstone of the European economy, accounting for roughly 7 percent of GDP and supporting some 13 million jobs directly and indirectly. The new flexibilities are being sold as a lifeline for regions still heavily dependent on internal combustion engine production, from parts of Romania to industrial hubs around Bratislava and Saxony. The climate measures are also paired with a broader push to define what qualifies as “made in the EU” under a forthcoming Industrial Accelerator Act, alongside elements of a planned “clean industrial deal.” These initiatives aim to channel public support toward European-produced small EVs and cleaner steel.

China, the U.S. and “strategic autonomy”

Commissioners have been unusually explicit in contrasting their approach with U.S. subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act and China’s rapid scale-up of EV manufacturing and battery capacity. The proposed industrial rules would set content requirements so EU funding flows primarily to vehicles assembled in the bloc with significant European components. At the same time, they leave room for foreign partnerships, reflecting the reality that Europe remains dependent on third-country suppliers in key areas.

Notably, batteries would not be fully counted in certain price-ratio calculations tied to support schemes, signalling that strategic autonomy will be gradual rather than absolute.

How the package is supposed to work in practice

Demand side: why corporate fleets matter

The Commission’s logic rests heavily on fleet dynamics. Around 60 percent of new cars and nearly 90 percent of new vans in the EU are first registered by companies. Because these vehicles typically enter the second-hand market after just a few years, and roughly 60 percent of Europeans buy used cars, officials argue that tightening fleet rules today will make affordable EVs more widely available to households tomorrow. Binding national targets are also framed as a way to provide investor certainty, ensuring predictable flows of capital into clean vehicles, charging networks and grid upgrades.

Supply side: batteries, fuels and steel

On the supply front, the package is linked to a €1.8 billion battery support scheme aimed at strengthening the European ecosystem. This includes €1.5 billion in interest-free loans through a proposed “battery booster facility,” as well as €200 million earmarked for diversifying critical raw material sources. The CO2 compensation mechanisms tied to sustainable fuels and low-carbon steel are intended to spur domestic investment in green industrial technologies. Meanwhile, harmonised car labelling, including information on battery state-of-health for used EVs, is designed to reassure second-hand buyers and protect residual values.

Fault lines and unanswered questions

“Contradictory signals” on 2035

During the press conference, journalists repeatedly pressed commissioners on whether easing compliance with the 2035 standards while ramping up EV demand amounted to sending mixed signals. Officials rejected that characterisation, describing the proposals as “mutually reinforcing”: one boosting supply flexibility, the other strengthening demand. They warned that moving on only one front risked creating bottlenecks. Critics, however, are likely to argue that super-credits for small EVs could allow manufacturers to continue selling larger numbers of combustion cars into the 2030s, potentially locking in emissions for years.

Enforcement, loopholes and “regulatory arbitrage”

Another unresolved issue is enforcement. Can binding national fleet targets genuinely reshape corporate purchasing behaviour, or will companies exploit regulatory differences by shifting vehicle registrations across borders? The Commission maintains that fines and other coercive mechanisms will ensure compliance but has offered few concrete details on how oversight would work in practice. Questions also emerged about why the EU continues to regulate tailpipe emissions rather than full life-cycle emissions. Officials responded that the current file focuses on use-phase pollution and must be read alongside broader frameworks such as emissions trading and burden-sharing rules covering upstream emissions.

Geopolitics and the new energy shock

Recent tensions in the Gulf have added a geopolitical dimension to the debate. Commissioners argue that accelerating electrification, strengthening power grids and expanding renewable energy are central to reducing Europe’s dependence on imported oil.  In their view, the package is as much about energy security as climate ambition, part of a wider effort to shield the continent from volatile global price swings. They also link the strategy to national policy shifts, including new nuclear investments and broader attempts to diversify Europe’s energy mix and build long-term resilience into its transport system.

What to watch next

The proposals now head into what promises to be a contentious legislative phase in the Council and European Parliament. Flashpoints are likely to include the 90 percent CO2 target, the scope of super-credits and the conditions attached to “made in EU” support. Environmental NGOs are already signalling pushback over what they see as backsliding. Some member states may resist binding fleet targets, while industry groups are expected to lobby hard on content requirements and compliance costs. 

Key milestones are already clear. National fleet obligations would begin in 2030. And 2035, still the politically charged horizon for the de facto phaseout of combustion engines, now comes with considerably more wiggle room built into EU law.

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TRIBUNE

March 26, 2026

In this guest opinion, representatives of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats outline their position on the European Commission’s latest automotive proposals. While supporting limited flexibility for the industry, they warn against compromising the EU’s climate ambitions and call for a socially fair green transition that protects both workers and competitiveness.

As a massive investment mountain looms ahead, the EU would be wrong to sacrifice a socially fair green transition. For the first time since the foundational Schuman Declaration of 1950 and the creation of the ECSC, the European Union faces an unprecedented, triple transition challenge: securing our defense, mastering the digital age, and delivering the green transition. The first two are currently progressing with broad consensus. Defense budgets across Member States are surging to historic highs, with many decisively surpassing the 2% NATO (that is now a 5) baseline to adapt to new geopolitical threats. Similarly, digital investments are breaking records; we see initiatives like France’s €54 billion France 2030 plan and billions more in foreign capital pouring into European AI development every month. Yet, while these investments are largely consensual, the climate transition remains highly divisive. We cannot afford this division, because the green transition is the existential imperative of our time. The stakes are unequivocal: without drastic and immediate action, the World Bank estimates that climate change could force up to 216 million people globally to become internal climate migrants by 2050. To secure our future and mitigate these disasters, the European Commission itself has estimated that Europe needs over €620 billion in additional annual investments. This is not just an environmental necessity; it is a macroeconomic reality. Ambitiously, under the European Green Deal of 2019 and the subsequent Climate Law, the EU enshrined a binding target to reach climate neutrality by 2050. Within this framework, the automotive sector (7% of the EU’s GDP and direct and indirect provider of livelihoods for nearly 13 million Europeans) was given a clear mandate: to reach a 100% Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) target for new

cars by 2035. Now, the Commission is proposing a retreat, suggesting a rollback of this target from 100% to 90%. Pressured by the right, Ursula von der Leyen is also stepping back from social ambitions while regulating corporate vehicles without any plan regarding fair transition. We cannot afford an unfair green transition at a time when income inequalities are rising across all European economies. The transition must be designed for everyone, not only for those who can afford it. While it is tempting to view this merely as ceding ground to relentless industry lobbying, we must face the current geopolitical and economic realities with absolute lucidity. The European automotive industry is a crown jewel of our industrial heritage. It is a massive job provider, the backbone of countless regional economies, and operates through complex, interlinked supply chains spanning the entire Schengen Area.

Today, this vital sector is caught in a brutal vise. On one side, we face an export behemoth in China, which is flooding our markets with cheap, heavily state-subsidized electric vehicles. On the other, the United States has upended decades of free-trade consensus with the protectionist Inflation Reduction Act, aggressively drawing green investments across the Atlantic. In this context of unprecedented complexity, the S&D group is stepping up to the plate. We are prepared to support these temporal, strictly exceptional adjustments to the 2035 target. As such,we are willing to pass the incentives on low and zero emission corporate vehicles, as we undoubtedly are to support an ambitious and protective “made in Europe” criteria. We do this to afford our European industrial champions, and the millions of workers whose livelihoods depend on them, the necessary breathing room to adapt, innovate, and reclaim the road to global excellence. However, let us be absolutely clear: for the S&D, the green transition and the social adaptation are decisive, and they will never be relegated to the background. Those proposals must not be interpreted as a surrender to our climate and social goals. It will have a marginal impact on the long-term struggle the EU wages against global warming, provided we use this time wisely. We will make sure those

texts include larger social dimensions and concrete solutions for the low and middle classes to face climate change. This adjustment must serve as a powerful incentive to get Europe’s green industry back in the game, ensuring that our path to climate neutrality remains ecologically uncompromising, economically resilient, and, above all, socially just.

S&D

INSIDE THE PARLIAMENT

The Greens Draw Blood as Corporate Fleet Deal Takes Shape

May 18, 2026 · 5 min read

BRUSSELS – A deal is quietly crystallizing inside the European Parliament on the regulation of corporate vehicle fleets, and the Greens/EFA are making sure no one forgets what was left on the table to get there.

The file, which sets decarbonisation targets for company cars and vans across Member States, had a promising start. The Commission’s own impact assessment pointed to a net economic benefit of up to €17.5 billion for the European economy between 2029 and 2050 under high-ambition scenarios. The numbers were there. The political will, it turns out, was not.

What emerged from negotiations is a text that Greens/EFA MEPs describe as a retreat from the Commission’s already-cautious baseline. The proposal allowed vehicles emitting up to 50 g CO₂/km to count as low-emission, a threshold the Greens argued was too generous from the start. In the trilogue process, it only got worse, with co-legislators broadening the categories of qualifying vehicles in ways that, according to the group, will lock in combustion technology for years.

The plug-in hybrid problem nobody wants to talk about

At the centre of the Greens’ criticism is what they call the “technological neutrality” trap. The principle sounds reasonable, don’t pick winners, let the market decide. In practice, they argue, it’s a fig leaf for keeping combustion-engine vehicles in the game under a green label.

The numbers they cite are striking. Plug-in hybrids, often marketed as a bridge to full electrification, have been shown in real-world conditions to emit between 90 and 105 g CO₂/km for private vehicles, and between 175 and 195 g CO₂/km for company cars. That’s not a transitional technology. That’s a fossil fuel vehicle with a charging port.

Biofuels fare no better in the Greens’ accounting. Citing Transport & Environment data, they point to deforestation pressures and land-use costs equivalent to the area of Ireland, land that could otherwise be used for food production, as the hidden price of treating biofuels as a climate solution.

Who moved, and why

The political story behind the text is one of coalition-building with uncomfortable side effects. The EPP held firm on flexibility and technology openness, that was expected. What surprised some observers was the willingness of Renew Europe and the Socialists & Democrats to join that coalition, with both groups signing onto compromise language that, in the Greens’ reading, prioritised short-term political optics over long-term industrial strategy.

The Greens are blunt about their interpretation: fossil industry lobbying. They call out the affordability argument made by S&D, that consumers need technology choice to manage costs, as internally inconsistent, given that plug-in hybrids add roughly €0.92 per kilometre in running costs and synthetic fuels are projected at €6 to €8 per litre. Electric vehicles remain more expensive at point of purchase, but that gap is narrowing rapidly.

For the Greens, the only group that didn’t move is them. Whether that reads as principle or isolation depends on where you sit.

BRUSSELS DISPATCH

T&E to EU Lawmakers: Stop Hiding Behind Flexibility

May 18, 2026 · 4 min read

BRUSSELS, Transport & Environment isn’t mincing words this week. As Parliament and Council negotiators enter the final stretch of trilogue talks on the EU’s automotive legislative package, Europe’s most prominent clean transport NGO has issued a blunt warning: flexibility is not a compromise, it’s a failure strategy.

The statement, addressed directly to Commissioners, MEPs, Council representatives and journalists, lays out T&E’s position in terms that leave little room for diplomatic interpretation. Binding emission standards. Full regulatory certainty. Industrial strategies aligned with climate objectives. And no loopholes, not for combustion engines, not for corporate vehicles, not for anyone.

The China argument

T&E’s sharpest line is an economic one, not a climate one. The NGO argues that the short-term compromises currently being discussed in Brussels will cost Europe its competitive position against China, not in the abstract, but concretely, in the electric vehicle supply chains that will define the next industrial era.

The logic is straightforward: regulatory ambiguity discourages the long-term investment commitments that manufacturers need to retool production lines and build out EV infrastructure. Every “flexibility” mechanism introduced into the text, every percentage point of wiggle room, every alternative compliance pathway, is, in T&E’s framing, a signal to industry that Europe is not serious. And China, which is serious, will fill the gap.

Addressed to everyone – including the EPP

What’s notable about the T&E statement is the political breadth of its audience. The organisation explicitly names every significant group in the Parliament, the Greens, the Left, S&D, Renew, EPP, ECR and ESN, and calls on all of them to stop what it describes as “justifying inaction.”

The message is aimed with particular force at those who claim to speak for European industry. T&E’s argument: if you genuinely want European manufacturing to compete globally, protecting combustion technology with flexibility carve-outs is not industrial policy. It’s industrial sentimentality.

“Leadership means acting now, not protecting what is already failing,” the statement reads, language calibrated to sting centre-right MEPs who have framed their positions as pragmatic pro-industry realism.

What T&E will and won’t accept

On the automotive package specifically, T&E draws a clear line. Revision is acceptable, but only if it strengthens the transition to zero-emission mobility. Any amendment that creates pathways for continued combustion, whether through technology neutrality clauses, extended compliance timelines, or alternative fuel credits, will be opposed. The same standard applies to corporate vehicle targets.

The organisation frames this not as environmental advocacy but as a matter of European strategic interest. The question it puts to lawmakers is simple: do you want Europe to lead the next industrial cycle, or to manage the decline of the last one?

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BRUSSELS INFLUENCE

Industry Groups Break Cover – and Complain They Weren’t Heard

May 18, 2026 · 4 min read

BRUSSELS – With a final vote on EU vehicle regulations days away, a coalition of automotive and mobility industry associations has taken the unusual step of publishing an open letter to EU institutions – not to lobby for a specific outcome, but to complain about the process itself.

Signed by representatives of ACEA, E-Mobility Europe, ChargeUp Europe and Leaseurope, the letter is addressed to Commissioners, MEPs, and Council members. Its central claim: that stakeholders were sidelined during the legislative discussions on Regulations 2025/0420 and 2025/0421, and that this exclusion has damaged both the quality and the legitimacy of the process.

A democratic complaint from paid advocates

The letter is self-aware about its awkward position. “It is true that we are paid,” the signatories write, preemptively addressing the obvious retort, “but this does not make us corrupt.” Their argument is that professional representation reflects genuine alignment with the interests of members, manufacturers, leasing companies, charging infrastructure providers, whose commercial realities should inform regulation if that regulation is to work in practice.

It’s a fair point, and a complicated one. Brussels is saturated with stakeholder voices, and the complaint that any given group wasn’t heard enough is a staple of every legislative cycle. What makes this letter notable is the breadth of the coalition, industry and infrastructure, manufacturers and mobility services, and the timing, published just days before the committee vote that will ratify or reject whatever trilogue deal emerges.

What they’re actually asking for

The letter stops short of demanding specific amendments. It doesn’t ask for flexibility mechanisms, revised targets, or technology neutrality provisions. Instead, it calls for something more procedural: dialogue. Not as a lobbying vehicle, the signatories insist, but as a way to ensure that the people who will have to implement the legislation had a meaningful chance to shape it.

“Stakeholders also contribute technical expertise, operational experience and implementation perspectives,” the letter argues, the kind of knowledge that determines whether a regulation works as written or spawns years of workarounds and compliance disputes.

Reading between the lines

What the letter doesn’t say is as revealing as what it does. The coalition doesn’t explicitly oppose the regulations, doesn’t call for rejection, and doesn’t name specific provisions it considers unworkable. That restraint is strategic: an open demand for weaker standards would be politically toxic and would hand ammunition to T&E and the Greens, whose own public statements this week frame industry involvement as the source of the problem, not the solution.

Instead, the industry coalition is making a softer, harder-to-dismiss argument: not “the rules are wrong,” but “we weren’t properly consulted.” It’s a position designed to survive whatever outcome emerges from the vote, and to lay groundwork for the implementation phase, where the real battles over these regulations will be fought.

The question now is whether, with a committee vote days away, anyone in the institutions is still listening.

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The EV Industry’s Most Articulate Lobbyist Just Published Its Manifesto. Here’s What It Actually Says.

May 19, 2026

E-Mobility Europe’s op-ed lands as trilogue negotiations enter their final hours, and it’s not just a plea for ambition. It’s a full industrial strategy argument wrapped in climate language.

POLITICO EU Staff · Analysis of E-Mobility Europe op-ed by Jonathan Depre6 min read

BRUSSELS – Ahead of what could be a make-or-break week for EU vehicle legislation, E-Mobility Europe’s senior policy advisor Jonathan Depre has dropped a dense, research-heavy op-ed that is worth reading carefully,  not because it breaks new ground on the politics, but because it reveals exactly how the pro-EV industry coalition is framing its last-minute push on negotiators.

The headline argument is clean: Europe doesn’t need flexibility. It needs certainty. But beneath that bumper-sticker line lies a more sophisticated, and more strategically interesting, case that has less to do with climate and more to do with supply chains, China, and who owns the operating systems of the future.

What it is responding to : 

• Trilogue negotiations this week on Regulations 2025/0420 and 2025/0421, covering passenger car CO2 targets and corporate fleet mandates
• Council pressure to raise credit caps for renewable fuels (3%→4%) and low-carbon steel (7%→10%) toward the 2035 targets
• Proposals to lower the 2035 zero-emission target to as low as 60%, floated by conservative groups
• Ongoing exclusion of heavy-duty vehicles from the corporate fleet mandate scope

The core argument

2035 is not a climate deadline. It’s an investment signal.

This is the central reframe in Depre’s text and the one most likely to land with MEPs who are uncomfortable with climate moralism but receptive to industrial policy logic. The 2035 target, in E-Mobility Europe’s framing, isn’t primarily about emissions. It’s the anchor on which factories get planned, supply chains get financed, and workers get trained. Weaken it, and you don’t gain flexibility, you trigger an investment freeze.

The organisation projects €300 billion in added value and over 500,000 jobs contingent on maintaining the 100% target. It also invokes the Porter hypothesis, the academic argument that well-designed environmental regulation drives innovation and economic performance,  to make the case that ambition and competitiveness are not in tension. They are the same thing.

“Backtracking on a target that has already been set creates unfair competition, it rewards those that lagged behind whilst penalising the pioneering firms needed for an effective transition.”

That framing is aimed squarely at centre-right MEPs who’ve been presenting dilution as pro-industry pragmatism. Depre’s counter is that it’s actually the opposite: a subsidy to laggards at the expense of the manufacturers who have already committed capital to electrification.

The China problem

This is about operating systems, not just cars.

The op-ed’s most pointed section isn’t about CO2. It’s about what Europe would actually be importing if it stepped back from industrial leadership in e-mobility. Battery cells, yes, but also embedded software, data protocols, and the semiconductor architectures that underpin modern electric vehicles.

Depre frames these as “crucial inputs” with no easy substitutes. A Europe that loses mastery over these components doesn’t just import cars. It imports someone else’s operating system,  and becomes structurally dependent on it. That’s a sovereignty argument, not an environmental one, and it’s calibrated to resonate in the current political climate where “strategic autonomy” is the phrase every political group claims to support.

On the “Made in EU” question, E-Mobility Europe backs the Parliament’s position of 70% Union-origin content by 2033, and explicitly rejects the Council’s softer 75% threshold proposal as leaving too much room for national discretion and import dependency.

The credits problem

The Council’s “pragmatism” is a path dependency trap.

The section on compliance credits is the most technically dense part of the op-ed, and the most directly relevant to the current trilogue. The Commission proposed allowing manufacturers to count sustainable fuels (3%) and low-carbon steel (7%) toward meeting their 2035 targets. The Council wants to raise those caps to 4% and 10% respectively.

E-Mobility Europe’s argument against this draws on path dependency theory: by lowering the marginal cost of staying with combustion architecture, credits divert R&D resources away from zero-emission innovation. Firms optimise for the easiest compliance pathway, not the most ambitious one. The result, Depre argues, is a “lock-in” effect that wastes investment on technologies, plug-in hybrids, e-fuels, that are fundamentally incompatible with climate neutrality and misallocate renewable energy better used in aviation and shipping.

On e-fuels specifically, the op-ed raises an enforcement problem that deserves more attention: it is technically impossible to verify that a vehicle runs on 100% carbon-neutral fuel throughout its useful life. This creates a permanent compliance loophole, and one that regulators cannot close after the fact.

The fleet argument

Corporate fleets are the real affordability mechanism. Not flexibility.

This is the part of the op-ed that reframes the affordability debate most directly. Corporate fleets account for 60% of new car registrations and 90% of new van registrations. Rental cars turn over within a year. Leased vehicles within three to five. A strong corporate mandate doesn’t just decarbonise commercial transport, it floods the second-hand market with used electric vehicles at pace, which is how EVs become accessible to private households.

Depre’s pitch to affordability-minded MEPs is therefore: if you actually care about EV access for ordinary citizens, you should be strengthening the corporate mandate, not diluting it. The current negotiations have also excluded heavy-duty vehicles from the mandate scope, kicking them to a future review. E-Mobility Europe wants them in, pointing to their 25% share of road transport CO2 emissions and the fact that they are almost exclusively registered by legal entities, making them the ideal candidate for a mandate-driven demand signal.

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What to watch

The charging infrastructure argument is the quiet concession.

The op-ed ends with a section on charging infrastructure and Vehicle-to-Grid technology that reads like a deliberate acknowledgment that the industry’s critics have a point. Depre cites research confirming that inadequate charging infrastructure remains the primary barrier to mass EV adoption, and calls on Member States to streamline permitting, implement binding deadlines for approvals, and build pan-European grid capacity maps.

This is notable because it accepts the practical argument made by flexibility advocates, that targets are meaningless without infrastructure, while refusing to accept their conclusion. The answer to inadequate charging is not lower targets, Depre argues. It is better infrastructure delivery, faster permitting, and accountability for Member States who have failed to build the networks that compliance requires.

Whether that argument lands in the final hours of trilogue is the question. The infrastructure argument has historically been deployed in Brussels as a reason to delay rather than a reason to accelerate. E-Mobility Europe is betting it can be reframed as the latter,  and that there are enough MEPs in the room who will find that framing more politically useful than a straight fight over percentages.