{"id":401,"date":"2026-05-16T17:05:11","date_gmt":"2026-05-16T16:05:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wp.sim-ex.eu\/financialtimes\/?page_id=401"},"modified":"2026-05-18T22:32:00","modified_gmt":"2026-05-18T21:32:00","slug":"maximilien-jagiello-interview","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/wp.sim-ex.eu\/financialtimes\/maximilien-jagiello-interview\/","title":{"rendered":"Exclusive Interview with Maximilien Jagiello, the EPP rapporteur on the CO2 standards for cars and vans to the ENVI Committee"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Exclusive and In-Depth Interview<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

“We are very strong. We are all tied together” \u2014 EPP rapporteur Maximilien Jagiello on the eve of the CO\u2082 trilogues<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Maximilien Jagiello is an MEP for the European People\u2019s Party and serves as rapporteur on the CO\u2082 standards for cars and vans revision in the EP’s ENVI committee. In that role, he will negotiate the respective file on behalf of the Parliament in next week\u2019s trilogues with the Council and Commission.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On May 15, Jagiello met the FT for an exclusive and in-depth interview on the upcoming trilogues, the nature and origin of the EP mandate for the negotiations, and the political dynamics of the last months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Jagiello laid out why he thinks ENVI’s mandate is more democratic than the Council approach, how he views amendment 67b and cooperation with far-right groups, and his priorities for the trilogues.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Joshua Starbatty<\/strong> in Paris | Published MAY 17 2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Part 1 \u2014 The EP mandate and the Council’s general approach<\/em><\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>Mr. Jagiello, thank you for agreeing to speak with the Financial Times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello: <\/strong>Thank you for inviting me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> On April 17, ENVI voted on amendments and gave you the mandate to negotiate the CO2<\/sub> standards on its behalf. Can you give us an overview of where the EP landed? What are the main elements that define the EP\u2019s position, and how different is it from the original Commission proposal?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>We decided to go much further than the Commission’s initial proposal and to include a number of innovations. One example is the lifecycle assessment. We also added more flexibilities regarding the biofuel credits and rebalanced them with the steel ones. And we adapted the fine system to make sure that infrastructure gaps or other investment burdens of firms are considered. Beyond that, we included social safeguards to protect workers. Compared with the Council approach, I think we did something deeper and more democratic, actually taking care of the people that are affected by the regulation. We wanted a more pro-European but balanced revision that combines the climate challenges, the industrial reality, and the technical realities we cannot change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> We are going to come back to the specific elements you mentioned. First, let us look at the headline change around the CO2<\/sub> standards revision: the 2035 emission target. ENVI decided to leave the Commission\u2019s proposal untouched, staying with the scrap of the combustion engine ban. How debated was this throughout the last months, especially considering that the S&D, which entered a coalition with the EPP and Renew to decide about the mandate, would have preferred the 100% target by 2035?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>From the beginning, the target was something we all agreed not to touch. From the EPP side, we did not want to go above 90%. The S&D did not want to go below 90%. Renew was just fine with 90%. Overall, this was the balance we agreed on in the spirit of compromise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>There are other groups in the Parliament which were very vocal against that, for example the Greens and the Left. What do you say to those who argue that softening the ban does not help the EU automotive industry, but rather undermines its competitiveness vis-\u00e0-vis players from China and elsewhere?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>This is specifically the reason we had to lower the target. Even with our best intentions to make things green and right \u2014 the current state of the industry, the unfolding of electrification, but also of the electric charging infrastructure in some of our member states \u2014 made the 100% goal unfeasible by 2035. Staying with the target would have devastating consequences for manufacturers, and plunging such a big sector of the EU economy would plunge the EU’s economy as a whole. This is what we wanted to avoid, also because we need room for investment to drive the green transition. It is not an ideological question but a pragmatic one. Importantly, the 90% number set by the Commission was calculated so that it does not undermine the 2050 target of climate neutrality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“Compared with the Council approach, I think we did something deeper and more democratic, actually taking care of the people that are affected by the regulation.”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>Let us look at the EP mandate more closely. The initial Commission proposal included super-credits for small zero-emission vehicles. You tweaked the multiplier, going from 1.3 to 1.6. You also redefined the category of \u201csmall vehicles\u201d by unladen mass not exceeding 1,500 kg. What are your cases for these changes?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>The new multiplier has a twofold goal. First, it further incentivises firms to produce those small zero-emission electric vehicles. At the same time, it gives flexibility to manufacturers that struggle with other technical aspects to develop small electric vehicles and compensate for the 10% missing from the main target. The redefinition of the small electric vehicle \u2013 this is a pure technicality no one debated. The annex that the initial regulation referred to does not exist. One of our MEPs pointed this out and contacted both the Commission and the policy officers in the Parliament. Together they came up with a definition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>You also introduced guidelines for the \u201cmade-in-the-EU\u201d definition to work with the super credit system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>:<\/strong> Yes, the made-in-EU element was just too important for us to leave it as it was. We gave more specification and clarification as to what exactly a definition should look like, but we left room and did not set strict numbers. That is important because the upcoming Industrial Accelerator Act may set out a clearer definition and the Commission must also have the discretion to adapt the definition if the overall economic and global context changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>On the other side, the Council\u2019s general approach (GA) proposes a new super-credit until 2029 \u2013 a multiplier of 1.2 for \u201clow-emission vehicles\u201d up to 50 g CO\u2082\/km, so essentially for plug-in hybrids. You do not have anything equivalent in your text. How do you read this, and would you accept it in the trilogues?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>We were surprised to see this, because this was a very similar amendment to what was advocated by the far-right groups in the Parliament. However, if you look deeper at what the Council proposed, it is a much softer version than what for example the Patriots for Europe put forward. The issue with the far-right groups in the Parliament was that they wanted to change the definition throughout the whole text, replacing “zero-emission” with “low-emission”, which was not acceptable for us. The Council just added an extra multiplier for this category. We could potentially find some middle ground on this, depending for example on the level of the multiplier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“… the made-in-EU element was just too important for us to leave it as it was. We gave more specification and clarification as to what exactly a definition should look like, but we left room and did not set strict numbers.”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>The EP also inverted the Commission’s allocation of the post-2035 emissions offset, moving \u201clow-carbon fuels\u201d up from 3 to 5%, and steel down from 7 to 5%. The Council went the other way: 4% for fuels and full fungibility allowing steel to offset the whole 10%. Why did you opt for a balance between fuels and steel, and what could a compromise with the Council look like?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>Some of our coalition partners strongly advocated for biofuels, and some against. Therefore, we did not want to favour just biofuels or low-carbon steel but find a balance. This was the middle ground. It is also important to know that we had many discussions with the Commission about the technical legality and compatibility of those caps with other EU regulation, particularly the Renewable Energy Directive. So, we are curious to see how the Commission reacts to the Council suggestion and we will then move to the discussion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>Another new element in the EP mandate is the lifecycle thinking. You put forward another super-credit system with a multiplier of 1.3 from 2030 to 2034 for new zero-emission vehicles \u2013 redefined by having lifecycle emissions below 50 g CO\u2082\/km. You also want the Commission to develop a methodology and assess whether it is robust enough to employ it across the board. Why do you seek to move away from the tailpipe-emissions approach? How committed are you to this, given the Council’s GA contains nothing on lifecycle?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>The lifecycle approach was an innovation that was there from the very beginning. It was also supported by the other members of our coalition and especially Renew was very happy with it. The Commission was also involved from the beginning. We proposed a few ways to implement it, and the Commission gave us a precise technical recommendation as to which of those would work best. The current version is based on this recommendation, making it legally and technically meaningful. Importantly, we are not moving away from the tailpipe emissions. This is just a supplementary incentive on top for car manufacturers to take lifecycle emissions into account and lower them. We also connected a labelling amendment to this, because this is all about information, about scientific honesty and acknowledging that lifecycle emissions exist \u2014 production, waste, end-of-life treatment. Zero-emission vehicles are not zero. That is misleading. We wanted to acknowledge the whole process and reward the firms that take that into account. Specifically, because of this scientific-robustness approach, we are optimistic that the Council might be open to discussing and implementing such a mechanism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> To follow up on that: lifecycle emissions are notoriously hard to calculate. It is very complicated to look at the whole value chain and to include indirect emissions, for instance of electricity production. Considering some of the EPP\u2019s main goals throughout the last years \u2013 simplification, making things easier to understand and less bureaucratic \u2013 this seems to go against that idea?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>Yes, but the provision would be based on international ISO standards to calculate this. There are specific organisational groups that compute lifecycle emissions for all different types of cars. This is something that the manufacturers will not have to do themselves. The burden would rather be on the Commission side to adopt a methodology that would take into consideration those international standards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“… this is all about information, about scientific honesty and acknowledging that lifecycle emissions exist… . Zero-emission vehicles are not zero. That is misleading. We wanted to acknowledge the whole process and reward the firms that take that into account.”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> In the beginning you stated that an important goal of your coalition was to consider the social dimension. The compromise package contains some related provisions, which have no equivalent in the Council text. Most notable is the new Article 15c on the Just Transition Safeguards. It obliges member states that want to hand out public support to consider whether manufacturers comply with new obligations to report on restructuring and put forward workforce transition plans for redeployment and reskilling. However, there are no hard penalties written into the text in case of non-compliance. What would the article do in practice? Do you think it has the capacity to protect workers and ensure a fair transition?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>Overall, this article is not about punishing manufacturers. It is about making sure that companies benefitting from the flexibility we incorporated into the regulation cannot leave the workers behind. Yes, it is correct that it mostly functions through the notification and the reporting obligations. But the reason for this is to create visibility for what happens exactly during restructurings. A government workers’ committee will be notified, and most importantly, the Commission also monitors it systematically. It can also add delegated acts to adapt or strengthen the framework if needed. So, this article is about sending a clear signal: the green transition must be fair, and regulatory flexibility comes with social responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>To what extent was this article a price the EPP paid to form a coalition with the S&D? And accordingly, how important is Article 15c to keep the S&D on board?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>This was not a price to pay for us. The EPP’s initial reason for the revision of this regulation was to make sure that car manufacturers will not disappear, and that they do not fire workers. So, this is very much in line with these goals. Indeed, Article 15c was an S&D initiative and naturally they are attached to that amendment, but it is strongly supported by both EPP and Renew. It is important to look at all the components as a package and not as separate points defended by the respective groups. We are going to defend our package together as a coalition. We are also standing for the Parliament as a whole, especially considering that the Council has zero social safeguards or other measures to help workers in its approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> As regards the fines, the EP has built three mechanisms around the excess emissions premiums for manufacturers: the 55% Social Climate Fund earmark, the 15% investment offset from 2035, and the \u201cInfrastructure Correction Factor\u201d tied to the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR). What is the thinking behind that?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>Starting with the 15% reduction in case of compensated investment, the rationale was that we did not want manufacturers to suffer from what you could call a \u201cdouble penalty\u201d \u2014 meaning additionally burdening those that already struggle to make the investments needed for electrification. The goal is to enable them to put more money towards the transition and accelerate it instead of slowing it down. But this is strictly conditional on investment and not a general fine reduction. For the infrastructure correction factor the idea was to make sure manufacturers do not pay the price for something they do not control \u2013 insufficient infrastructure that negatively affects regional demand. And then for the Social Climate Fund earmark: this is to make sure that in the case of fines, they support the green transition, and especially those member states and the regions, where electrification still needs to accelerate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“We are going to defend our package together as a coalition. We are also standing for the Parliament as a whole, especially considering that the Council has zero social safeguards or other measures to help workers in its approach.”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>Let me follow up on the infrastructure correction factor. It says that if manufacturers fail to meet the targets in a member state that is failing its own AFIR targets, the fine is lowered. However, most manufacturers do not only sell in a single country \u2014 they sell across the EU and globally to some extent. So why would you tie an alleviation in the emissions premium, to a member state’s compliance with AFIR?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>The fine reduction applies to the cars produced within the member state that failed the target. So, if there is a manufacturer that has production sites all over the Union, the reduction of the fine would only apply for the proportion of the cars that are produced within the member states affected by the insufficient-infrastructure issue. It is not a general reduction that would apply to the manufacturer fleet as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>There is another element that made it into the mandate: amendment 67b. Essentially, it seems to be a \u201ccrisis suspension clause\u201d. However, there are many question marks around this. To name just a few, 67b does not define what exactly constitutes a crisis. It also does not lay out who should determine that and by when. There is no specification of a process behind the suspension. It says the EP could decide that member states can derogate from the regulation, which would undermine the nature of the instrument of a \u201cregulation\u201d itself. It is also unclear how a temporary suspension of a long-term transition policy that is the CO\u2082 standards would help in an acute crisis, looking for instance at the current energy price shock. With all that in mind, what is the thinking behind 67b? Does it bring added value to the regulation or simply a lot of uncertainty and legal unclarity?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>You said most of it. If this amendment was not in the compromise package, it was for a reason. It is not because it is something we are fundamentally against, but specifically because of the legal and technical weakness of it. First, why the definitions are missing: 67b is only half an amendment. The other half was deemed non-admissible by the Parliament\u2019s secretariat and therefore we could not use it for negotiations. Second, we received feedback from the Commission during the negotiation on the first half, saying that there are other emergency mechanisms that exist within the EU legal framework, and that such mechanisms are usually not directly implemented within regulations. After all, for us who negotiated the compromises, 67b is more of a technical artefact or incident. It is not something we take seriously as a meaningful amendment also because of how it was voted. It was a last-minute thing that was neither discussed with me as rapporteur nor with any other shadows involved in the negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“If this amendment was not in the compromise package, it was for a reason. … 67b is more of a technical artefact or incident. It is not something we take seriously as a meaningful amendment…”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Maximilien Jagiello looks positively at the upcoming negotiations with the Council, stressing a strong internal cohesion of the coalition between EPP, S&D and Renew in the ENVI committee.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Part 2 \u2014 Political dynamics and the trilogues ahead<\/em><\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> I would like to follow up on what you just described last, because indeed, the political dynamics have created some confusion for outside observers. On the one side you have built a seemingly very stable centrist coalition of EPP, S&D and Renew that was able to pass 16 compromise amendments. And on the other side, you have this \u201cstray\u201d amendment in 67b. While not sponsored by one of your coalition members but the ECR, the amendment was supported by parts of the EPP. One of your MEPs even publicly spoke about a “67b coalition”, encompassing EPP, S&D, Renew and the ECR. Beyond that we have only seen that framing from the ECR itself; however, there has not been any public rejection by you or by other leading figures in the EPP, despite visible dispute in the coalition. For instance, Renew shadow Madeleine Bonnet lashed out, calling the amendment \u201clegally weak\u201d and \u201ctechnically unnecessary\u201d and criticising EPP support, while EPP member Romain Yborra criticised that the S&D allegedly refused to be photographed alongside the ECR after the plenary vote. What kind of dynamic are we witnessing here? Is there a \u201c67b coalition\u201d and what does all this say about the internal cohesion of your coalition?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>No, there is no 67b coalition. Some things that have been posted do not represent the EPP as a whole. The amendment made a lot of noise, but in practical terms it is not meaningful, and it will be rediscussed in trilogues anyway. Most importantly, this did not damage our coalition or have any political consequences. For us who negotiated the compromises, we see it is a lesson to better communicate the technical side of negotiations with everyone to prevent such a situation from happening again in the future. On the ECR question and political dynamics more generally: From the beginning, we decided internally in the EPP to exclude cooperation with the far-right, because we want to live up to our historical integrative, centrist and pro-European position. We wanted to show people that it is still possible to provide a strong pro-European and democratic negotiating framework for climate policy without cooperating with populist forces. While we agreed not to reach out to far-right groups, in our attachment to democratic principles, we were still open to listening to everyone that wanted to talk to us. This included the ECR, but for example also the Left. Throughout the last months, we saw that there were some ECR members that were more pragmatic than we expected, and some were partly aligned with what we advocated for. Therefore, there were points from the ECR that we ended up including in the compromises. This led to the ECR supporting most of the compromises of our package, building an even wider majority for the final vote, but this does not make them part of the coalition that negotiated the compromises. But to stress this again, we were not only open to speak with the ECR but with everyone, and we also included proposals by the Left such as the inclusion of the 55% Social Climate Fund earmark.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“… there is no 67b coalition. Some things that have been posted do not represent the EPP as a whole.”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>Ultimately, the compromise package was negotiated and adopted jointly with EPP, S&D and Renew. Can you walk us through how that coalition came together?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>The coalition emerged in the earliest stages of the process as we already had discussions before the 1st<\/sup> committee meeting. While preparing the draft report, we had a meeting to hear about the positions from all the groups. It confirmed that with S&D and Renew we were already very aligned. Our cooperation was then reflected in the draft report, but the biggest achievement were the compromise amendments. Negotiating this was a time-consuming process, but we managed to get through this together as a team. It ended up creating close bonds between the groups, just by working on it together for so many hours and supporting each other throughout the process. The process was of course also open to other MEPs from the committee, not just shadows and the rapporteur, who were able to bring more detailed expertise regarding their own amendments, for example for everything that concerned SMEs. During the voting week, we coordinated most of our moves, for example, the communication strategy. We were also coordinating from the beginning with the chair about the organisational parts of ENVI. All of this created a strong cooperative spirit within the committee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> How strong is your coalition going into the trilogues, and how do you plan to coordinate next week?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>We are very strong. We are all tied together. We already coordinated to study the Council’s approach in detail and to prepare our strategy. It was a warm and emotional reunion for us after a few weeks of break. During the next week we will be constantly in contact, aligning every single position before it is executed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“While we agreed not to reach out to far-right groups, in our attachment to democratic principles, we were still open to listening to everyone that wanted to talk to us.”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>With the mandate, ENVI has put forward a very comprehensive overhaul of the original proposal. The Council’s GA has changed little in direct comparison. Walking into the first trilogue next week, what are your top priorities? Which things do you absolutely want to secure, and where are the red lines?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>We will focus on some main priorities in the negotiations, for example, the lifecycle assessment, which we want to keep in the text. The social provisions are also important for us, to have this strong social approach rooted within the regulation. Then, the biofuels and steel rebalancing \u2014 to make sure it is legally and technically correct and supports both of the flexibility tools.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>The Commission is technically the broker but of course it has its own preferred outcome, which is something very close to its original proposal. Given that the Council’s GA is much closer to the initial proposal, how do you expect the Commission to act?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>It is true that the Council’s approach is closer to the original proposal, but the Council did not seek technical advice from the Commission as much as we did. We had a lot of consultative feedback for the compromise amendments. Looking at the Council\u2019s amendments, we thought some of them were quite bold in terms of legal and technical aspects. So, we are curious to see how the Commission will react to that. However, we expect them to not play a big political role, but to stay with their role as keeper of the EU legal framework and to make sure that the outcome we negotiate is technically and legally feasible and meaningful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“We will focus on some main priorities in the negotiations, for example, the lifecycle assessment …”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>Do you think there are member states that are more aligned with the EP’s position, and less with the Council’s GA? Do you think you can profit from the Council’s internal dynamics?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>For now, we have not really looked at specific member states. But we need to hear from them what exactly they say towards our proposals, and we will try to see which countries align the most with our own interests and find room for compromise that can be acceptable for both institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT:<\/strong> The CO\u2082 standards are only one side of the medal. There is also the Clean Corporate Vehicles regulation that is negotiated in parallel. How do you see the connection between the two files, and do you think the CCV will influence the negotiations on the CO\u2082 standards, and vice versa?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>As has been stated since the beginning: we work specifically on the supply side. The other file is focused on creating demand for EVs. We cannot discuss one file without referring to the other. That being said, it is too early to say how the trilogues will influence each other. One common point might however be the made-in-EU part. If they have a different definition from ours, we will try to align. They do not have to be the same, but it is something we should discuss across committees. Generally, we will be updated on what is happening in both rooms simultaneously, and we will move between the rooms to leverage points that could have mutual impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“… the Council did not seek technical advice from the Commission as much as we did. … Looking at the Council\u2019s amendments, we thought some of them were quite bold in terms of legal and technical aspects.”<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>On a personal note: how would you characterise the journey throughout the last months, and what have you learned, working on this file?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello<\/strong>: <\/strong>I am sad it is over soon. I learned how demanding it is to organise this work and how important it is to have allies \u2013 people you can trust and rely on. You cannot do everything on your own. European policymaking is complex and it requires a lot of expertise. You need to organise the meetings, you must coordinate with the technical staff, the Secretariat, the Commission, while keeping an overview of what is happening on all those different levels. You also have to resist the external pressure from those that are not aligned with your approach. For that it is important to have a good team around you. It was an intensive but a beautiful journey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FT: <\/strong>Mr Jagiello, thank you for your time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jagiello: <\/strong>Thank you for having me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Also read: <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is the “Green Coalition”? \u2014 An exclusive Interview<\/a><\/strong>
\u2013<\/strong> by Joshua Starbatty | MAR 25 2026<\/strong>
The FT spoke with a group of member states that plead for more climate ambition in the automotive package and decided to form a \u201cGreen Coalition\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The divisive question of how to save the European automotive industry<\/a>\u00a0\u2013<\/strong>
by Joshua Starbatty<\/strong> | FEB 18 2026
<\/a><\/strong>The Commission\u2019s automotive package sparks controversy among lawmakers, industry and civil society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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